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BANKRUPTCY SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of the recession (perhaps because of it), the caseload of the
Tenth Circuit was not demonstrably heavier than in prior years. As will
be seen, a number of the cases involved interesting examples ofjudicial
interpretation and application of various provisions of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code as amended. A number of them will be, or have been ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. If there is any theme or trend in the
Circuit, it is continuing interpretation of that still relatively new statute.
This survey attempts to describe and analyze selected cases of the
Tenth Circuit for the 1991 calendar year. The only bankruptcy cases
ignored for this purpose have been unreported cases, cases involving
only matters of procedure and cases involving only questions of state
law unrelated to bankruptcy issues. The cases selected for treatment
cover a broad range of topics and many should be of interest to non-
specialists.
II. POWERS OF THE BANKRuPTcY COURT
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit encountered an array of diverse ques-
tions on the powers of the bankruptcy court. None of the cases involved
jurisdictional questions; a few involved routine matters and have been
omitted from this survey.
A. Application of Equal Access to Justice Act: O'Connor v. U.S. Dept. of
Energy
In the first case, O'Connor v. U.S. Department of Energy, 1 the Tenth
Circuit held that a bankruptcy court was a "court" within the meaning of
a provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). The EAJA pro-
vides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party ... fees and.., costs
... in certain cases "brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action .... -"2 The Department of En-
ergy ("DOE"), as an unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding,
had filed a motion to enforce a reorganization plan and alternatively, to
convert the bankruptcy from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 proceeding.
After the bankruptcy court denied the motion, the debtor requested and
the court granted costs and attorney fees under the above cited provi-
sion of EAJA. Upon appeal, the district court reversed; debtor appealed
to the Tenth Circuit.
The only circuit to have addressed the application of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(a) to bankruptcy courts was the Eleventh Circuit. How-
l. 942 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
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ever, the Eleventh Circuit's decision, In re Davis,3 was controlled by
Bowen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue4 which held that the non-Article
III tax court lacked jurisdiction to award EAJA fees. In O'Connor, the
Tenth Circuit declined to let the issue turn on whether a court was an
Article III court. Applying a "plain meaning of the language" approach,
the court noted the differing terms "court" and "Court of the United
States" and concluded that the term "a court" and "any court" included
the bankruptcy court.5 A final comment noted that this result was con-
sistent with the "undisputed purpose of the EAJA to encourage individ-
uals and small businesses to challenge adverse government action
notwithstanding the high cost of civil litigation."
6
B. Right toJury Trial. In re Republic Trust & Savings Co.
In re Republic Trust & Savings Co. 7 is one chapter of a case originally
decided by the Tenth Circuit in 19908 and reviewed by the Supreme
Court in the same year.9 Inasmuch as last year's Denver University Law
Review Tenth Circuit Survey did not include bankruptcy cases, mention
of the case in this year's survey seems appropriate.
Republic Trust & Savings was an uninsured financial institution
which filed a Chapter 11 petition in 1984. A year later, the trustee
(Langenkamp or the predecessor trustee), instituted adversary proceed-
ings to recover voidable preferences against appellants who had re-
deemed thrift and passbook savings certificates totaling over $713,919
within the 547(b) ninety day look back period (preceding the filing of the
petition).1 0
After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court found that the payments
constituted voidable preferences and the appellants appealed. In the
1990 decision, the Tenth Circuit panel held that the payments were not
excepted under either 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) or (c)(2)' 1 and these con-
clusions were not appealed. An additional argument of the appellants in
3. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990). See also In re
Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1991).
4. 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983).
5. 942 F.2d at 773-74.
6. Id at 774.
7. 924 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. In re Republic Trust & Savings Co. (Langenkamp v. Hackler), 897 F.2d 1041
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 245 (1990).
9. Langenkamp v. Culp, 11 S. Ct. 330 (1990).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) reads in pertinent part: (b) Except as provided in sub-
section (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property-... (4) made-(A) on or within 90 days before the date of filing of the petition
11. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) and (2) state:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new
value given to the debtor, and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
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the 1990 Tenth Circuit case, was that the district court had erred in de-
nying them a jury trial on the trustee's preference claims.
The Tenth Circuit, applying the complex test of the recent Supreme
Court decision, Granfinandera, S.A. v. Nordberg,12 agreed that those ap-
pellants who had not filed claims against the debtor's estate were clearly
entitled to a jury trial. Surprisingly, in an attempt to apply the law of the
Granfinandera case, the Tenth Circuit held that even those appellants
who did file claims were also entitled to a jury trial.13 Apparently, the
court felt the trustee's action against all recipients of payments should
be subject to the right to ajury trial, even though some of the recipients
filed claims, because certain of the claimants still had monies invested
with the bankrupt.
The trustee filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court on this last point and in a brief per curiam opinion, the Court
stated:
In Granfinanciera we recognized that by filing a claim against the
bankruptcy estate the creditor triggers the process of "allow-
ance and disallowance of claims," thereby subjecting himself to
the bankruptcy court's equitable power .... If the creditor is
met, in turn, with a preference action from the trustee, that ac-
tion becomes part of the claims-allowance process which is tria-
ble only in equity.14
On remand, the Tenth Circuit vacated that portion of its prior opinion
granting a right of jury trial to those appellants which had filed claims
against the estate.
C. Control of Dilatoiy Debtors: In re Frieouf
In a case involving administration of estate issues, debtor Randy
Arden Frieouf filed an underlying Chapter 11 petition on September 20,
1985.15 Frieouf engaged in conduct for over three years (throughout
the bankruptcy proceedings), which evidenced a pattern of evasion. For
example, debtor failed to file a plan within the time limits, failed to com-
ply with orders to file disclosure statements, and was dilatory in filing an
amended disclosure statement and a third reorganization plan over a
period of three years. On February 14, 1989 the bankruptcy court dis-
missed the Chapter 11 petition with prejudice to the filing of any bank-
ruptcy petition for three years. The district court affirmed. Frieouf
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms
12. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
13. "Despite these appellants' claims, the trustee's actions to avoid the transfers, con-
solidated by the bankruptcy court, were plenary rather than a part of the bankruptcy
court's summary proceedings involving the 'process of allowance and disallowance of
claims."' 897 F.2d at 1046-47.
14. Langenkamp, 111 S. Ct. at 331.
15. In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 117 L.Ed.2d 408 (1992).
1992]
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appealed to the Tenth Circuit, claiming, inter alia, that the bankruptcy
court had no authority to limit access to bankruptcy relief for three
years.
Section 349(a) 16 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a bankruptcy
court to permanently disqualify a class of debts from discharge for
cause. But the section does not on its face state that a bankruptcy court
may deny future access to bankruptcy.17 The Tenth Circuit (Judge Seth)
reasoned that the statute's language was plain and held that the bank-
ruptcy court's denial of all access to bankruptcy court for more than 180
days was beyond the authority conferred by section 349(a). 18 The
Tenth Circuit upheld the order dismissing Frieouf's bankruptcy, but re-
versed and remanded the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy
court's judgment denying the debtor all access to court beyond 180 days
for debts unrelated to this case.19
D. Bankruptcy Court Supervision - Formal Notice to Creditors in Chapter 11
Cases: In re Unioil
A relatively routine case, In re Unioil,20 involved the bankruptcy
court's powers of supervision over the administration of a case. The
debtor was an oil and gas exploration company which filed for reorgani-
zation under Chapter 11. In spite of the filing, one of its officers made
post-petition transfers, triggering creditor objections that led to a stipu-
lation and court order that Unioil would make no transfers without court
approval. After confirmation of the plan, the creditors' committee dis-
covered transfers and assignments to parties related to the debtor in
violation of this order. The bankruptcy court granted a motion to set
aside such transfers and issued an order to that effect. After a hearing,
the court also entered an order barring the claims of the assignees inas-
much as the court found such assignees (limited partnerships related to
the debtor) were on inquiry notice of the bankruptcy proceedings.
2 1
Initially, the Tenth Circuit faced a jurisdictional question. The no-
tice of appeal had identified appellants as "Appellant Partnerships, Dal-
16. 11 U.S.C. § 349(a) reads:
(a) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under
this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts that
were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under
this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a subsequent petition
under this title, except as provided in section 109(f) of this tide.
17. See also, 11 U.S.C. § 109(g):
(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no individual or family
farmer may be a debtor under this title who has been a debtor in a case pending
under this title at any time in the preceding 180 days if-
(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to
abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecu-
tion of the case; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the
case following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay pro-
vided by section 362 of this title.
18. 938 F.2d at 1104.
19. Id. at 1105.
20. 948 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1991).
21. Id. at 680-81.
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ton Development Project No. 1 et al. and other partnerships. '2 2 Van
Bebber, district judge sitting by designation, applied Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co. 23 which held that "et al." fails to provide notice to the ap-
pellants. Thus, the Tenth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction only over
Dalton.
24
The opinion had little problem with the creditor's argument that
the order setting aside the transfers was invalid. The court held that
such an order was a valid exercise of the court's equitable power to en-
force its own orders. 25 The Tenth Circuit did, however, reverse that
part of the bankruptcy court's order barring the claims of Dalton Devel-
opment.2 6 Debtor relied on In re Green,2 7 in arguing that actual knowl-
edge of the bankruptcy proceeding amounted to constitutionally
adequate notice. However, Unioil distinguished the notice required in a
Chapter 7 case such as Green, from the actual formal notice required by
Reliable Electric Co., Inc. v. Olson Construction Co.,28 for the purposes of a
Chapter 11 proceeding.2 9 In light of the above conclusion, the court
reversed the lower court decision and remanded for appropriate action.
III. AUTOMATIC STAY
A necessary feature of any bankruptcy proceeding is the automatic
stay which prevents most creditor activity with respect to the assets of
the estate. Recurring reports in the press to "filings under the protec-
tion of bankruptcy" reflect this feature of the law. Two cases from the
Tenth Circuit 1991 caseload interpreted this important provision.
A. Tolling Effect of the Automatic Stay: Valley Transit Mix of Ruidoso,
Inc. v. Miller
In order that bankruptcy does not cause the loss of a non-bank-
ruptcy right, 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)30 provides for the tolling of any non-
22. IL at 681.
23. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
24. 948 F.2d at 681-82.
25. Id at 682.
26. Apparently, the barring of the claims of the other unnamed partnerships are not
affected by this decision in that as ruled, supra, they were not within the jurisdiction of this
appeal.
27. 876 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1989).
28. 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).
29. See also N.Y. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) indicating that
a creditor with actual knowledge of a reorganization proceeding has no duty to inquire
about further court action.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c):
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy
law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a
period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bank-
ruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with respect to
which such individual is protected under section 1201 or 1301 of this title, and
such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such
period does not expire until the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period oc-
curring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay
1992]
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bankruptcy statute of limitations during the period the stay is in effect.
Valley Transit Mix of Ruidoso, Inc. v. Miller31 involved an action by B.C.R.
and others to enforce mechanic's liens against land owned by the Miller
group. The land had been leased to Ruidoso Recreation, Inc. which
made the improvements on the Miller land. Shortly after B.C.R. filed its
lien, Ruidoso filed bankruptcy. The issue was the effect of the automatic
stay arising out of that bankruptcy on the enforcement of the lien
against the Miller land. Miller argued that the instant action to enforce
the B.C.R. lien was time-barred by the New Mexico statute inasmuch as
B.C.R.'s action to enforce the lien against Miller's land was not stayed by
the Ruidoso bankruptcy. The lower courts rejected this narrow reading
of the scope of the automatic stay. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding
that the automatic stay applied to action to enforce a debt against the
debtor-lessee, including the foreclosure of a lien against land of the les-
sor.3 2 Thus, B.C.R. was protected by the tolling of the New Mexico stat-
ute by the bankruptcy filing pursuant to section 108(c).
B. Exception for Governmental Proceedings: Eddleman v. United States
Dept. of Labor
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code specifically provides that the filing of a
petition does not operate to stay "the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such gov-
ernmental unit's police or regulatory power."'3 3 In Eddleman v. United
States Dept. of Labor,3 4 the debtors operated a mail-hauling business
which they continued to operate as debtors-in-possession after a Chap-
ter 11 filing. After such filing, the Department of Labor (DOL) filed an
administrative action against the debtors alleging pre-petition violations
of the Service Contract Act 35 (SCA) requiring minimum wages and ben-
efits for those obtaining certain federal contracts. As part of this action,
DOL sought to liquidate claims for back wages due the debtors' employ-
ees and to include the Eddlemans on a list of entities debarred from
contracting with the government for a three year period. The bank-
ruptcy court held that the action was subject to the automatic stay and
did not come within the section 362(b)(4) exception.3 6 The district
court affirmed noting that the exception was intended to prevent viola-
under section 362, 922, 1201, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with
respect to such claim.
31. 928 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1991).
32. Id. at 355-56.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4):
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of
an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power
34. 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-58 (1988).
36. 923 F.2d at 790.
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tions of regulatory laws. It also reasoned that "regulatory laws that con-
flict directly with control of the res or property by the bankruptcy court
are not excepted by Section 362(b)(4)." 3 7 The Eddlemans appealed to
the Tenth Circuit which reversed.
Much of the Tenth Circuit opinion, authored by Judge McKay, in-
volved a jurisdictional question of appealability. Holding that a denial
of the DOL's claim of exemption from the automatic stay was an appeal-
able final order, the court turned to the issue involving the asserted ex-
emption. The court outlined two tests which have been used by the
bankruptcy courts to determine the scope of the governmental exemp-
tion.3 8 Under the "pecuniary purpose" test, the exemption does not
apply if the governmental action is primarily for the purpose of protect-
ing a pecuniary interest as opposed to protecting matters of public pol-
icy. The "public policy" test asks whether the action is aimed at
effectuating public policy or if it is aimed at adjudicating private rights.
Actions taken for the purpose of advancing private rights are not in-
cluded within the exemption.
The instant case does not admit of an easy answer. Certain mini-
mum wages and benefits are required by the SCA. The administrative
activity would determine how much the bankrupts owe their employees,
and in that regard the proceedings do adjudicate private rights. On the
other hand, the proceedings might result in an order taking the bank-
rupts off the list of approved contractors who deal with the United
States. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit decision leaves many questions
unanswered. It reversed the lower courts without adopting either of the
above outlined tests. The court preliminarily rejected the district
court's limitation of the exemption because it interfered with the bank-
ruptcy court's control over debtor assets.
The Tenth Circuit opinion pointed out that the language of section
362(b)(4) contained no such limitation.3 9 Next, the court ruled that the
DOL's proceedings were exempt from the automatic stay under either
the "pecuniary purpose" test or the "public policy" test.40 As to the
"pecuniary purpose" test, the opinion concluded that the agency's ac-
tion with respect to wages had the purpose of preventing unfair compe-
tition.4 1 With respect to the "public policy" test, the agency request for




38. These tests are outlined in a Sixth Circuit case, NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting,
804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986).
39. 923 F.2d at 790.
40. Id at 791. There is not much difference between these tests although they are
apparently treated as two separate tests. Perhaps the courts should combine the tests and
refined the single resulting test. There is not that much authority on the issue at this time.
See id at 790, n.12.
41. Id. at 791.
42. Id.
19921
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IV. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
Under 11 U.S.C. § 541, the bankruptcy estate is created from all of
the non-exempt property of the debtor as of the commencement of the
case. With certain limited exceptions, assets acquired by the debtor af-
ter the commencement of the case4 3 belong to the debtor and are part
of the debtor's "fresh start." One Tenth Circuit case in 1991 involved a
significant issue regarding pensions, which issue is currently being re-
viewed by the Supreme Court.
A. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan: In re Harline
An interesting and important case for attorneys generally and bank-
ruptcy attorneys particularly is In re Harline,4 4 in which the Tenth Circuit
held that a pension and profit sharing plan, one which was a qualified
plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"),4 5
was not part of the bankruptcy estate. There is now a significant split on
this question involving at least eight circuits. The Supreme Court has
recently granted review in one of these cases.
4 6
The debtor, a Dr. Harline, filed a petition for reorganization of his
affairs under Chapter 11 and the petition was subsequently converted
into Chapter 7 proceedings. The debtor had not listed as an asset of his
estate his beneficial interest in a profit sharing trust of the Weber Clinic,
Inc. The trust had been established as a corporate retirement plan in
1960. At the time of the bankruptcy filings, Weber Clinic was a profes-
sional corporation with the bankrupt as the sole shareholder. He was
also the sole remaining beneficiary of the trust and sole member of its
deferred compensation committee. The assets of the trust were three
insurance policies with cash values totaling over $300,000.
After learning of the existence of this asset, Gladwell, the bank-
ruptcy trustee, sued the bank trustee of the plan. Harline assumed re-
sponsibility for the defense of the action and alleged that his interest in
the plan was not an asset of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2) which
provides: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy
law is enforceable in a case under this title." Specifically, Harline made
the argument that the trust was within this subsection either (1) because
the trust was a valid spendthrift trust under Utah law, or (2) because the
trust qualified as a pension and profit sharing plan under ERISA. The
bankruptcy court ordered the plan to turn over the asset, the district
court affirmed and Harline appealed.
The first part of the opinion written by Judge Logan discussed the
viability of Harline's argument that the plan was an effective spendthrift
trust. It is generally conceded that "nonbankruptcy law" referred to in
43. The principle does not apply in Chapter 13 proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 1306
(1988).
44. 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (amended 1991).
46. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 932 (1992).
828 [Vol. 69:4
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section 541 (c) (2) 4 7 applies at least to state law recognition of spendthrift
thrusts. After an appropriate analysis of Utah law, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that (1) Utah would probably recognize the doctrine of
spendthrift trusts, but (2) the trust in question did not qualify as a
spendthrift trust because of the bankrupt's control of the res as the only
officer, director, and shareholder of the Weber Clinic which had the
power to amend or terminate the plan.
48
The second part of the Harline opinion wrestled with a question
which has split the circuits: 4 9 Does an ERISA qualified pension come
within the § 541(c)(2) provision as effective under "nonbankruptcy
law?" A number of statutory provisions are relevant. Under ERISA,
"each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided by the plan may
not be assigned or alienated." 50 This provision suggests that a qualify-
ing plan is a restriction on alienation effective under nonbankruptcy law
and therefore is not property of the estate. On the other hand, the Code
elsewhere exempts pension payments.5 ' This provision suggests that to
completely exempt a plan under ERISA would render its purpose mean-
ingless. Judge Logan's opinion cites four circuits as limiting "nonban-
kruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust law.52 The discussion in the
legislative history does focus exclusively on state spendthrift trust law,
supporting this view.
The opinion in Harline cited three recent circuit court holdings to
the contrary.53 Judge Logan characterized these cases as "hold[ing] that
an appeal to legislative history is inappropriate here because the lan-
guage of 541(c) (2) is clear."'54 The Tenth Circuit decision found no rea-
son to narrowly read the language of the proviso. It determined that the
legislative history was not limiting and cited other examples of federal
law being included as "nonbankruptcy law." 5 5 Similarly, the opinion
discussed the purposes of ERISA and concluded, "[o]ur construction of
541 (c) (2) harmonizes the Bankruptcy Code with the dear policy and in-
tent of ERISA."'5 6 The case was remanded for a determination as to
whether the plan in question did in fact qualify under ERISA.
The issue in the Harline case is of obvious importance. The pres-
47. See supra note 11.
48. 950 F.2d at 671-72.
49. Id. at 670.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (d)(10)(E) (1988), which exempts payments under a pension
or profit sharing plan "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the debtor."
52. 950 F.2d at 673. (citing Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel) 771 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re
Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726
F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984); Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff) 706 F.2d 574, 577 (5th Cir.
1983)).
53. Id, (citing Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 2275 (1991); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 83 (3rd Cir. 1991); Anderson v.
Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1477 (4th Cir. 1990)).
54. 950 F.2d at 673 (quoting In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir. 1990)).
55. Id. at 675.
56. Id.
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ence of ERISA assets in future bankruptcies can only be expected to
increase and the debtor's interest in a pension fund can constitute an
attractive asset to the trustee in a no-asset case, or to creditors generally.
Colorado lawyers should be aware of a recent amendment to the exemp-
tions law of Colorado which adds to its list of exemptions:
[p]roperty, including funds, held in or payable from any pen-
sion or retirement plan or deferred compensation plan, includ-
ing those in which the debtor has received benefits or
payments, or has the right to receive benefits or payments, or
has the right to receive benefits or payments in the future and
including pensions or plans which qualify under the federal
"Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974" as an em-
ployee benefit plan, as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002, any individ-
ual retirement account, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 408, and any
plan, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 401, and as these plans may be
amended from time to time.
57
This, of course, is of broader application than the decision in Harline,
and of interest to planning attorneys.
58
The Supreme Court has recently granted review of this question.5 9
The case on review, Shumate v. Patterson,60 is the second case from the
Fourth Circuit to hold that the ERISA provision is "nonbankruptcy law"
for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). 6 1 Patterson, like the Harline
case, involved a debtor who allegedly had great control of the funds re-
maining in the fund. A panel of the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion writ-
ten by former Dean Phillips, held that all that was required for the
section 541 proviso to apply was that the plan be ERISA qualified. 62 An
additional chapter in this story should be in next year's survey.
63
B. Tax Refunds: In re Barowsky
Tax refunds can be an important factor in planning the timing of
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. While In re Barowsky 64 includes no
new law, it is included as another example of this recurring matter. The
Barowskys filed a bankruptcy petition on July 24, 1987 and received a
57. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-102(l)(s), 1991 Cum. Supp. (effective May 1, 1991).
58. For a recent discussion of the possibilities of the Act and certain limitations, see
Paul G. HymanJr., Prebankruptcy Planning: Conversion of Nonexemp Assets into Exempt Assets, 21
CoLo. LAW. 231 (1992).
59. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 932 (1992).
60. Schumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991).
61. See supra note 11.
62. 943 F.2d at 365.
63. A recent decision in Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991) held that an
Arizona statute similar to the above-cited Colorado statute is preempted by ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) which states:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title. This section shall take effect onJanuary 1, 1975.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
64. In re Barowsky, 946 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991).
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discharge on December 3, 1987, upon the trustee's stipulation that it
was a no-asset case. The trustee learned that the debtors received an
income tax refund check for $1,092.74 for the 1987 calendar year. The
trustee reopened the case to recover that part of the refund applicable
to pre-petition earnings arguing that this asset was a pre-petition asset
and thus was property of the estate. The Barowskys' motion to establish
their right to the entire refund was denied by the bankruptcy court and
the district court agreed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the authority of Kokoszka v. Belford.
6 5
The debtor's attempt to distinguish the Kokoszka case (because the peti-
tion in bankruptcy in that case was filed after the end of the tax year) was
rejected, as well as the argument that a change in the law was effected by
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
V. DEBTOR'S EXEMPT PROPERTY
Only one Tenth Circuit case in 1991 dealt explicitly with the subject
of debtor exemptions. The Harline case, discussed above, involved a re-
lated topic and should be consulted by the attorney who is counseling a
debtor approaching the possibility of a bankruptcy filing. The case fea-
tured here concerned, among other issues, the question of what pre-
bankruptcy financial activity is permissible in taking advantage of a statu-
tory homestead exemption.
A. Pre-bankruptcy Planning: Converting Nonexempt Property to Exempt in
Anticipation of Bankruptcy: In re Carey
Patricia G. Carey was a stockbroker and former officer and director
of her husband's business, the Carey Lumber Company. In 1984, she
executed a number of personal guarantees to cover the business's in-
debtedness. 6 6 Late in 1985 Carey Lumber began to experience cash
flow shortages. The company filed a Chapter 11 petition on October 20,
1986 and Marine Midland, appellant, began an action for alleged fraud
against Carey's husband. Carey filed her petition on April 20, 1988.
Marine Midland filed an "Objection to Claim of Exemption" and a
"Complaint Objecting to Debtor's Discharge" alleging that her activi-
ties in liquidating her nonexempt assets in order to reduce the mortgage
on her homestead should lead to a court denial of the homestead ex-
emption and that she should be denied a discharge. 6 7 Marine Midland
also recited a number of acts as evidence of fraudulent intent. The
bankruptcy court gave judgment in favor of Carey and she ended up
with a homestead exemption under Oklahoma law on a $300,000 home
with a $30,000 mortgage. The district court affirmed and Marine Mid-
land appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court rulings. The opinion
65. Id. at 1519 (citing Kokoszka, 417 U.S. 642 (1974)).
66. In re Carey, 938 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 1075.
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commenced with a quote from an Eighth Circuit opinion stating: "[T]he
conversion of non-exempt to exempt property for the purpose of plac-
ing the property out of reach of creditors, without more, will not deprive
the debtor of the exemption to which he otherwise would be entitled."
'68
Furthermore, Congress had determined that a debtor should be permit-
ted to convert nonexempt property into exempt property before filing a
bankruptcy petition, that the practice was not fraudulent as to creditors,
and that it permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to
which it is entitled under the law.
6 9
The appellant wanted the court to deny Carey a discharge in that
the activities complained of constituted fraudulent conveyances. 70 Cit-
ing varying authorities, the court outlined certain fundamental rules
about transfers to hinder, delay or defraud. To deny a discharge under
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), a court must find actual intent to defraud credi-
tors. The desire to convert assets into exempt forms by itself does not
constitute actual intent to defraud. Extrinsic evidence of fraudulent in-
tent is required, although fraudulent intent to conceal assets may be es-
tablished by circumstantial evidence, or by inferences drawn from a
course of conduct. Judge Logan's opinion noted that the cases are pecu-
liarly fact specific. He indicated that the bankruptcy court had found
that Carey's actions were not fraudulent and concluded that, on the
facts, the Code sections require more evidence than Marine Midland of-
fered. 7 1 The lower court decisions were affirmed.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CASE
A. Involuntary Petitions
Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code governs petitions for involun-
tary bankruptcy. Among other provisions therein, creditors are prohib-
ited from indiscriminately filing an involuntary petition against a debtor.
When a bankruptcy court dismisses a petition for involuntary bank-
ruptcy, the debtor may recover costs under certain circumstances. In
the case of a bad faith filing, it may also recover damages from the peti-
tioning creditors. A strangely worded subsection of section 303 caused
unnecessary litigation and a thorny interpretive problem for the Tenth
Circuit in In re Peterson.
68. Id at 1076 (quoting Norwest Bank of Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 873-74
(8th Cir. 1988)).
69. Id (citing H.R.REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6317; S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5862).
70. Id See I 1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988) which provides, "(a) The court shall grant the
debtor a discharge, unless - ... (2) the debtor, with intent to hinder delay, or defraud a
creditor ... has transferred .... or concealed - (A) property of the debtor within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition ......
71. Id. at 1077.
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1. Conditions for Recovery of Damages for Bad Faith Filings: In
re R. Eric Peterson Const. Co.
In September 1986, Quintek, Inc. (Quintek) petitioned to place R.
Eric Peterson Construction Co. (Peterson) in involuntary bankruptcy
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303.72 Quintek's counsel sent letters to all of
Peterson's subcontractors informing them of the involuntary petition.
The publicity, along with the filing, allegedly had a disastrous effect on
the financial viability of the company. Peterson opposed the petition,
alleging it had paid its bills on time, that the creditor's claims were sub-
ject to bona fide disputes and that the petition had been filed without
adequate investigation of the company's financial status.
At the hearing on creditors' motion to dismiss the petition, and in
response to the court inquiry into whether Peterson would consent to
the dismissal, Peterson's counsel responded that the debtor:
[w]ould like to indicate a reservation. The debtor does not ob-
ject to the petition being dismissed, but it is the debtor's feel-
ing that this petition was filed in bad faith and it wishes to
assert a claim under 303([i]). And we would like to reserve the
right, if we would go along with the dismissal, subject to reserv-
ing in the Court's jurisdiction [sic] and the right to have the bad
faith claim adjudicated under 303([i]).
73
The court dismissed the petition but retained jurisdiction to determine
the debtor's bad faith filing claim.
Summarizing the rather complicated procedural facts, for the pur-
poses of this Article, the bankruptcy court granted the creditors sum-
mary judgment on debtor's claim of bad faith filing and the District
Court, on its own motion, determined that the debtor's consent to dis-
missal deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction of the debtor's
good faith claim. 74 Thus, the issue in the debtor's appeal to the Tenth
circuit was whether the debtor consented to dismissal even though it
had specifically reserved a claim for the bad faith filing.
Without questioning why the obviously awkwardly worded statute
would so require7 5 , the Tenth Circuit opinion outlined its three require-
ments, namely: (1) dismissal of the petition, (2) something other than
consent of all petitioning creditors and the debtor and (3) non-waiver of
72. In re Eric R. Peterson Const. Co., 951 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1991).
73. Id. at 1177. See also 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1988):
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on consent
of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the right to
judgment under this subsection, the court may grant judgment -
(1) against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor for -
(A) costs; or
(B) a reasonable attorney's fee; or
(2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith, for -
(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or
(B) punitive damages.
Id.
74. 951 F.2d. at 1177-78.
75. See supra note 73.
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the debtor of its right to recover damages for bad faith filing.76 In other
words, the statute requires both non-consent to dismissal and non-waiver
of the debtor's right to damages.
The issue in Peterson turns on whether the debtor consented to dis-
missal of the bankruptcy petition when it did not object to the creditors'
voluntary dismissal of the bankruptcy petition - even though at the
same time it specifically reserved a claim against the creditors under sec-
tion 303(i) for alleged bad faith filing of the bankruptcy petition. The
Tenth Circuit opinion attached a common sense meaning to the word
"consent." It reasoned that the debtor should not be required to ac-
tively oppose dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy in order to pre-
serve a claim for damages under 303(i) if that petition was wrongfully
brought. 77 The court held that, as a matter of law, Peterson did not
consent to dismissal within the meaning of section 303(i). It reversed
and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of Peter-
son's appeal of the bankruptcy court's summary judgment determina-
tion on the bad faith issue.
78
B. Treatment of Secured Claims
The treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy has become one of
the topics much litigated in the shakedown following the enactment of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and the 1984 Amendments. Three Tenth
Circuit cases, two of which have been to the Supreme Court, are in-
cluded in this survey. These cases actually involved the so-called
"Chapter 20" filings. A number of debtors have been filing a straight
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 followed by a rehabilitative case under
Chapter 13. The extent to which a debtor may combine some advan-
tages of each chapter is presently unclear as the cases to be discussed
indicate.
1. "Lien Stripping": In re Dewsnup
The Tenth Circuit, in In re Dewsnup 79, was faced with a difficult in-
terpretive problem involving section 506. The Dewsnups borrowed
money secured by a deed of trust covering farmland. After default, fore-
closure proceedings were interrupted by the pendency of bankruptcy
proceedings. Following an aborted Chapter 11 proceeding, petitioners
sought liquidation under Chapter 7 and attempted to strip the lien
through the use of provisions of section 506. The bankruptcy court de-
termined the value of the land to be $39,000; the debt was over
$100,000.
Often, secured parties in bankruptcy are undersecured. That is, the
value of the collateral is less than the debt. Section 506(a) recognizes
this fact and provides that the creditor is a secured creditor to the extent
76. 951 F.2d at 1179.
77. Id. at 1180.
78. Id. at 1182.
79. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
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of the value of the collateral and an unsecured creditor for the excess
amount of the debt.8 0 However, section 506 further provides in subsec-
tion (d) that, insofar as a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is
not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.8 1 The Dewsnups argued
that under a literal reading of this language, the lender's lien should be
disallowed except to the extent of the present value of the land which
was $39,000. The effect of this application of the language, in the words
of Mr. Justice Blackmun in the case on appeal, was that "the creditor
would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property by the
time of the foreclosure sale."
8 2
After the bankruptcy court denied the petitioner's request and the
district court affirmed, the Tenth Circuit also affirmed. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision was based upon the questionable conclusion that because
the trustee would abandon the asset, the estate had no interest in the
asset as abandoned property. Because of a split among circuits on the
lien stripping issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and rendered
an opinion on January, 15, 1992.83 Over the dissent of Scalia and Sou-
ter, who would apply the clear language of section 506(d),8 4 the
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded. The majority
opinion (Thomas,J., not participating) ruled that inasmuch as the Bank-
ruptcy Code does "embrace some ambiguities," 8 5 the section "does not
allow petitioner to 'strip down' respondents' lien."'8 6 Unfortunately, in
deciding the case on the presumed intent of Congress not to change the
law on this point in the enactment of the 1978 Code, the opinion admit-
ted that the holding is of limited application.8 7 Bankruptcy lawyers
would probably agree with the assumption that Congress did not intend
the strip down effect of section 506(d). Lawyers and jurisprudential
types will probably continue to disagree on whether the dissent's ap-
proach is a desirable one.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 506, Determination of secured status, which states in pertinent part:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property.., and is an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the
amount of such allowed claim.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
82. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
83. I; Dewsnup v. Timm, I11 S. Ct. 949 (1991).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d):
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless-
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of
this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of
an entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
85. 112 S. Ct. 773, 777.
86. Id at 778.
87. "Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argu-
ment illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply
to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other
facts to await their legal resolution on another day. IdL at 778.
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2. "Bifurcation" of Secured Claims: In re Hart
One important provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) 8 8 permits a
Chapter 13 plan to modify a secured claim. The home mortgage indus-
try convinced Congress to make an exception to that rule in their favor8 9
and the present version provides that the plan may modify the rights of
holders of secured claims, other than a claim "secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 90 A
recent Tenth Circuit case, In re Hart, presented the question of whether
the bifurcation of a claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim
under section 506(a) was permissible where a mortgage on the debtor's
residence was undersecured.9 1 The Harts attempted a bifurcation in
their Chapter 13 plan where the mortgage secured a $55,000 indebted-
ness and the fair market value of the property was stipulated to be
$30,000. Recognizing the bifurcation of the claim would mean that the
unsecured portion of the claim would not be subject to the section
1322(b) (2) limitation, the creditor objected. The district court reversed
the bankruptcy court's approval of the plan and the Harts appealed to
the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that the plan
could bifurcate the creditor's claim. The majority opinion (a per curiam
opinion ofJJ. Moore and Tacha, even thoughJ. Brorby dissented) noted
the split of authority among the circuits.9 2 The courts differ basically on
balancing the extent of the protection afforded such creditors by Con-
gress against the effect of the clear use of the terms "secured claim" and
"unsecured claim" in section 1322. The court opinion found nothing in
the language of the section necessitating going beyond the statutory def-
inition of secured claim, "to protect the unsecured portion of an under-
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2):
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's princi-
pal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the
rights of holders of any class of daims;
89. See discussion of the legislative history, In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410, 1412 (10th Cir.
1991).
90. Id. (citing Gruggs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236)( ).
91. 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991) and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) which states:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoffunder section 553 of this title, is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the
case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such credi-
tor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such
allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valu-
ation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's
interest.
92. See cases cited in In re Hart, 923 F.2d at 1414. According to the opinion, the
Third and Ninth Circuits allow bifurcation while the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
treat it as inappropriate in Chapter 13 proceedings.
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secured home mortgage."' 95  The dissent, without elaboration,
concluded that this approach "renders section 1322(b)(2) essentially
meaningless."
'94
3. Secured Claims in Chapter 13: In reJohnson
One question resulting from a "Chapter 20" bankruptcy was an-
swered by the Supreme Court in a case coming from the Tenth Cir-
cuit. 95 In an attempt to increase the use of Chapter 13 by individual
debtors, section 1322(b)(2) permits a plan for adjustment of debts
under that chapter to modify the rights of holders of secured claims.
9 6
Johnson took steps after Home State Bank started to foreclose a mort-
gage on his farm property. First, he filed for a liquidation under Chap-
ter 7 and as a result of this action, he was discharged from personal
liability on the promissory notes to the bank. The bank still had a right
to proceed in ren against the real estate and re-initiated foreclosure, ob-
taining an in rem judgment. Prior to the foreclosure sale, the petitioner
completed the "Chapter 20" filing by filing under Chapter 13, staying
the foreclosure sale.
In the Chapter 13 proceeding, Johnson listed the bank's mortgage
on the farm as a claim against the estate-and, under the plan, proposed
to pay the bank in four annual installments and a final balloon payment
totalling the amount of the bank's in rem judgment. The bankruptcy
court confirmed the plan over the bank's objection. The bank appealed
to the district court arguing that (1) the debtor could not modify its
mortgage obligations under a Chapter 13 plan where the personal liabil-
ity had already been discharged in a Chapter 7 case, and (2) that the
court erred in finding that the plan was in good faith and feasible. The
district court agreed with the bank on the first point and the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with two
other circuit courts,9 7 and held that Congress did not intend such a
claim to be treated in a Chapter 13 plan even though the definition of
"claim against the debtor" in 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) "includes claim against
property of the debtor."98 Because of the split between the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Johnson case, 99 and reversed the
Tenth Circuit. 0 0
Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. 10 '
After examining the Code's use of the word "claim" throughout the
Code and citing its decisions adopting "the broadest available definition
93. Id at 1415.
94. Id at 1417.
95. In reJohnson, 904 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1990).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
97. See In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434, 1436 (1Ith Cir. 1989); In re Metz, 820 F.2d 1495,
1498 (9th Cir. 1987).
98. 904 F.2d 563, 565.
99. 111 S. Ct. 781 (1991).
100. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
101. The congruence between a "plain meaning" result and a perceived "intent of
Congress" result may be one explanation of the unanimous result.
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of 'claim,'- 102 the court discussed the bank's claim that "[s]erial filings
under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 . . .evade the limits that Congress
intended to place on these remedies."' 0 3 The opinion disagreed with
this argument, reasoning that Congress had expressly prohibited certain
forms of serial filings and therefore not this one. 10 4 The Court left to a
remand the issue of whether the plan was proposed in "good faith"
under section 1325(a)(3). 10 5 One expected issue to be settled following
this case is the judicial reaction to a claim that a serial filing of Chapter 7
followed by Chapter 13 in a foreclosure setting as was true inJohnson is,
per se, a bad faith plan. 106
VII. TRUSTEE AVOIDANCE POWERS
Inasmuch as a filing of the petition in bankruptcy operates to stay
creditor activity, the bankruptcy trustee is given certain substantive pow-
ers which benefit all of the creditors. The three powers most often liti-
gated are the "strong arm" power under section 544, the power to avoid
certain preferences under section 547 and the power to set aside fraudu-
lent conveyances under section 548. This survey includes one case from
each of these areas. The reader is also reminded that the Carey case,
discussed above under the topic of Debtor's Exempt Property, included
a discussion of pre-petition transfers to improve one's exemptions and
the extent to which such transfers were fraudulent conveyances.
A. The "Strong Arm" Power
The power of the trustee to avoid pre-petition transfers under sec-
tion 544 is often called the "strong arm" power since the power of
avoidance is sometimes exercised even though no actual creditor could
have acted. The following case illustrates the operation of the section in
the context of a real estate transfer.
1. Hypothetical Bona Fide Purchaser: Watkins v. Watkins
The strong arm power of the trustee under section 544(a) is a hypo-
thetical lien creditor power under (a)(1) and (a)(2), and a hypothetical
bona fide purchaser power under (a)(3).10 7 Under the latter subsection,
102. 111 S. Ct. at 2154.
103. Id at 2156.
104. Id
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a): Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm
a plan if... (3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden
by law. See also In re Johnson, 940 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1991).
106. See the opinion in the originalJohnson case in the Tenth Circuit and citation of
cases at 904 F.2d at 565. That opinion seems to treat serial filing and the listing of a
discharged claim as a bad faith plan.
107. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)(1),(2) and (3):
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred
by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the com-
mencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to
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applied in Watkins v. Watkins,10 8 the trustee may avoid a pre-bankruptcy
transfer of the debtor's property if such transfer under state law were
ineffective as against a bona fide purchaser "whether or not such a pur-
chaser exists."
10 9
Janet and Gregory Watkins were divorced in Oklahoma in 1986.
One of the assets, owned jointly, was a tract of commercial real property
containing Gregory's office. The divorce decree set aside this asset to
him and also imposed a lien on the property to secure his obligation to
pay alimony. Subsequently, Gregory filed a petition in bankruptcy
which prompted Janet to file a copy of the divorce judgment as a lien in
the county clerk's office. Gregory sought to avoid the lien under section
544(a) (3) on the ground that Janet had not perfected her lien at the time
of the bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court invalidated the lien;
the district court affirmed and Janet appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on a determination that under
Oklahoma law, a bona fide purchaser would take subject to the construc-
tive notice provided by the divorce judgment.' 10 That judgment, which
was the source of the ex-husband's sole title, also contained the limita-
tion of that title, the ex-wife's lien.
B. Fraudulent Conveyances
1. Fraudulent Conveyances: In re Kaiser Steel Corp.
An interesting question involving the trustee power to recover
property which was arguably the subject of a fraudulent conveyance was
finessed in In re Kaiser Steel Corp.,II' when the court applied another sec-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code. Kaiser Steel Corporation was the subject
of a leveraged buyout ("LBO") in which its former shareholders were
the recipients of cash and new shares. Sometime after the LBO, the new
entity, Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc., went into Chapter 11 proceedings
and promptly attempted to recover as fraudulent conveyances the pay-
ments made as a result of the LBO. Various defendants made the argu-
ment that the payments were "settlements" under section 546(e)11 2 and
such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple
contract could have obtained such ajudicial lien, whether or not such a credi-
tor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the com-
mencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such
credit, an execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such
time, whether or not such a creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the
debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected,
that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such trans-
fer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a pur-
chaser exists.
108. 922 F.2d 1513 (10th Cir. 1991).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).
110. 922 F.2d at 1514-15.
111. 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991).
112. 11 U.S.c. § 546(e):
(e) Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a) (2), and 548(b) of this ti-
de, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in
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non-recoverable. In an earlier appeal,1 13 the court held that payments
to financial intermediaries were protected by the "settlement" excep-
tion. Thus, Kaiser involved only the issue of whether the Schwab holding
should be extended to protect payments made to the shareholders. Sec-
tion 546(e) exempts from the trustee's avoiding powers "a transfer that
is a margin payment .... or settlement payment, as defined in section
741(8) of this title, made by or to a commodity broker, forward contract
merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency
...." "Settlement payment" is defined in section 741(8) as: "a prelimi-
nary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settle-
ment payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement
payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities
trade .... "1114
The debtor-in-possession naturally argued that these definitions
only protected intermediaries in the process of using brokers, margin
accounts and other organizations in the securities market. The defend-
ant shareholder and the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC")
115
argued for an all-inclusive protection of the securities markets including
shareholders. The latter argument was accepted by the Tenth Circuit
116
and unless the Supreme Court settles the question otherwise, the fasci-
nating law of LBO's as fraudulent conveyances must await another
forum.
C. Voidable Preferences
Certain transfers of property of the debtor to creditors made within
an arbitrary period of time, ninety days for most purposes, are avoidable
by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 547. The purpose of avoiding these
preferences (which are neither generally nor necessarily fraudulent con-
veyances or otherwise bad under state law) is at least twofold. One ac-
cepted purpose is to increase the amount of pro rata sharing that takes
place in the bankruptcy process and another is to inhibit creditors from
participating in a rush to the courthouse door which might unnecessarily
force a debtor into failure.
section 101(34), 741(5), or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined
in section 101(35) or 741(8) of this title, made by or to a commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution or securities clearing
agency, that is made before the commencement of the case, except under section
548(a)(1) of this title.
113. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (1988).
115. One may wonder why the SEC would assist the shareholders in so interpreting the
definition of "settlement payment" so as to preempt a determination of whether certain
LBO's might not be fraudulent conveyances. An examination of the SEC's brief in the
instant case sheds some light on the matter. Much of the brief argues that there is no
reason in the language of the statute to exclude payments by brokers to shareholders.
Discussing policy concerns, the brief states: "Investor confidence (in the securities market)
would be undermined if investors could be forced to give up payments received years
earlier in settled transactions." SEC brief at p. 17.
116. 952 F.2d at 1241.
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1. Time of Transfer in Payment by Check: In re Antweil
Much of the complexity of voidable preference law under section
547 involves an interaction of state and federal law. A recent decision of
the Tenth Circuit, now under review by the Supreme Court, is an illus-
tration of this complexity.
The issue in In re Antweil, 117 can be simply put. In the case of pay-
ment of a debt by a check, does a transfer under section 547 occur when
the check is delivered or when the check is honored by the drawee bank?
Obviously, the beginning of the 90 day period is unknown at the time it
occurs. One cannot predict the timing of a future filing of a petition.
However, after the event it becomes important to identify whether a
debt paid by check is paid when the check is delivered to the creditor or
when it is paid by the drawee bank.
In the Antweil case, debtors delivered a check on the 91st day prior
to bankruptcy and it was honored by the drawee bank within the 90 day
period. If the transfer of property of the debtor occurred when the
check was delivered, there was no preference within the suspect period.
In reversing the district court's holding that the transfer occurred upon
delivery, the Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 18
in ruling that the transfer did not occur until the check was honored or
paid by the drawee bank and therefore a transfer occurred within the
ninety day period. 1 19 The Supreme Court granted review120 and re-
cently affirmed the Tenth Circuit holding.121
2. Payments Made in the Ordinary Course of Business: Union
Bank v. Wolas (Supreme Court)
A 1991 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is noted in this Survey
because of its significance to certain Tenth Circuit cases discussed
herein. 1
2 2
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code included an extensive rewrite of the law
of preferences. Section 547(c)123 includes a number of transactions
which are not avoidable by the trustee even though otherwise they
would meet the definition of preference set forth in section 547(c).
Congress recognized that certain payments made by a debtor in the
usual course of business were definitionally preferences, such as
monthly payments for utility services, rent, etc. Hence, section
547(c)(2) provides that the trustee may not avoid a transfer:
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
117. 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991).
118. According to the court's opinion, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held other-
wise. See cites in 931 F.2d at 695.
119. 931 F.2d at 695.
120. Barnhill v.Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 48 (1991).
121. Barnhill v.Johnson, No. 91-159, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1955 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1992).
122. Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
123. See supra note 11.
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course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
In the 1984 amendments, Congress repealed the 45 day limitation with-
out otherwise changing the subsection.' 24 The effect of this latter
amendment was an issue in Union Bank v. Wolas. 12
5
ZZZZ Best Co. borrowed seven million dollars from Union Bank
and, during the ninety day period before ZZZZ Best filed for bankruptcy,
it made two interest payments to the bank. The bankruptcy court deter-
mined that such payments came within the ordinary course of business
exception and the district court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit reversed on
the basis of policies underlying the Code and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari 12 6 to resolve a split on the issue with the Sixth
Circuit. 1
2 7
Wolas, the trustee, argued that the exception did not apply to pay-
ments made by the debtor on long term debt. Applying a plain meaning
of the words approach to the statute as amended, Justice Stevens' opin-
ion (Justice Scalia, concurring) held that there was no reason to find
such a limitation to the exception. The Ninth Circuit decision was
reversed. 1
2 8
The importance of the decision in the Wolas case can only be as-
sessed by subsequent cases. Many routine preference questions will
need to be reexamined in the light of this case. For example, the pay-
ments made to depositors in the Republic Bank case, discussed above,
12 9
were assumed to be voidable preferences. After Wolas, transferees will
argue that such payments were made in the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" of the debtor. A cynical reader of the Wolas decision might feel
that much of the voidable preference power of the trustee disappeared
in the process.
VIII. DISCHARGE
One of the purposes and policies of the Federal Bankruptcy Code is
to afford the debtor a "fresh start." Many debtors file for bankruptcy
with the purpose of obtaining a discharge from pre-bankruptcy obliga-
tions. One continuing debate with respect to bankruptcy law issues is
the extent to which the discharge feature is abused. Section 523 of the
Code provides a number of bases for excepting certain debts from dis-
charge and section 727 outlines certain acts which will constitute
124. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353,
§ 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
125. 60 U.S.L.W. 4043, 4044-45 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1991).
126. Union Bank v. Wolas, 111 5. Ct. 2009 (1991).
127. In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990).
128. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4046.
129. See supra note 7.
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grounds for denying a discharge altogether. Several Tenth Circuit cases
involve this important topic of the discharge.
A. Collateral Estoppel and Burden of Proof. In re Tsamasfyros
In Brown v. Felsen,i30 the Supreme Court considered the extent to
which a non-bankruptcy court determination of facts, constituting
grounds for non-dischargeability of a debt in bankruptcy, could be used
in bankruptcy proceedings. The actual case involved a possible issue of
res judicata, but in a footnote, the opinion indicated that similar results
might follow from application of the principle of collateral estoppel. 131
The Tenth Circuit applied this footnote dicta in In re Tsamasfyros. 1
3 2
The bankrupt had been sued in state court and that court, after a four-
day trial, entered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of over $150,000.
In a written order, the judge held that the bankrupt's "actions in breach-
ing his fiduciary duties were attended by circumstances of fraud and by a
wanton or reckless disregard of [plaintiff's] rights and feelings."'
8 3
Within a month after this judgment, Tsamasfyros filed a petition in
bankruptcy and the successful plaintiff filed a complaint to determine
the dischargeability. The bankruptcy judge's order of non-dis-
chargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A),' 3 4 using the state court
finding, was upheld by the district court and appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit's affirmance of the decisions outlined a few mat-
ters of importance in applying the collateral estoppel rule. The appel-
lant's argument that a state court determination of fraud would not
equate with a bankruptcy determination because of a different standard
of proof became unmaintainable given the nearly contemporaneous de-
cision of the Supreme Court in Grogan v. Garner.'3 5 In that case, it'was
held that a "preponderance of the evidence" rather than a "clear and
convincing evidence" standard applies to all exceptions to dis-
chargeability of debts set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 523.136 The Tenth Circuit
also held that the fact that Tsamasfyros appeared pro se in the state court
proceedings on the facts, did not render collateral estoppel
irrelevant.13
7
130. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
131. ld at 139, n.10.
132. 940 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1991).
133. Id. at 605.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A):
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b),or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinanc-
ing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other
than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
135. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
136. Id at 659.
137. 940 F.2d at 607.
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B. Section 727 and Burden of Proof. In re Serafini
As just indicated, the Supreme Court decision in Grogan v. Garner
involved a ground for denial of dischargeability under section 523. An-
other 1991 Tenth Circuit case applied the reasoning of Grogan to a sec-
tion 727 case. In re Serafini13 8 began as an adversary proceeding
brought by a creditor to deny a Chapter 7 debtor of the discharge based
upon his alleged fraudulent transfer, removal, destruction, mutilation or
concealment of assets under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).13 9 The bankruptcy
court dismissed the complaint and the district court affirmed on the
grounds that the creditor had not met its burden of proof by the requi-
site clear and convincing evidence. 140 Subsequent to the date of the
judgment of the district court, the Supreme Court decided the Grogan
case, supra. The Tenth Circuit, McWilliams, J., held that even though
that case was a section 523 case, the same logic applied to denial of
discharge under section 727.141
One can speculate as to the general acceptability of Serafini's exten-
sion of Grogan to section 727 by analogy. The opinion by justice Stevens
in the Grogan case discussed the fact that the grounds for precluding
application of the discharge to certain debts under section 523 were re-
lated to state created causes of action which might have a different bur-
den of proof. In cases involving possible application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, the opinion noted, reduction of litigation would fol-
low from the same standard for burden of proof. This consideration
seems to have much less weight or relevance in the context of the
grounds from the denial of a discharge set out in section 727. This re-
viewer predicts that a split will develop among the circuits on this issue.
C. "Dischargeability of Taxes and Penalties: In re Bergstrom
Bankrupt failed to file income tax returns for certain pre-petition
tax years and following bankruptcy proceedings the IRS served delin-
quency notices on Bergstrom. 14 2 Debtor filed a motion to reopen the
case to determine the dischargeability of the tax liability and the bank-
ruptcy court denied the motion. A hearing was held in the district court
which affirmed the bankruptcy court. In the Tenth Circuit, Bergstrom
contended that, since the tax liability was determined through "substi-
138. 938 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir. 1991).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2):
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an
officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has
transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted
to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed-
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition;
140. 938 F.2d at 1156.
141. Id. at 1157.
142. In re Bergstrom, 949 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1991).
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tute filings" made by the commissioner, and since such filings were
"prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes" according to 26
U.S.C. § 6020(b)(2), such liabilities did not come within the exception
from discharge provided in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B). 14 3 The Tenth Cir-
cuit (Barrett, Senior Circuit Judge) had no problem holding that a sub-
stitute form for the purpose of the Internal Revenue Code was not a
filed form for the purposes of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
144
D. Protection of the Discharge: In re Walker
While In re Walker,14 5 involved little new law, the application of ex-
isting principles is instructive. The Higleys filed suit against real estate
agent Ralph Walker and others in Utah state court for Walker's alleged
deceptive appropriation of funds from the Higleys during a consumer
real estate transaction. The proceeding was halted temporarily when
Walker filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy court in Utah, but re-
sumed when that petition was dismissed. Walker did not attend the re-
sumed proceedings because he intended to refile for bankruptcy.
Formal entry of judgment for the Higleys did not occur until after
Walker's Chapter 7 petition was filed. Walker received a discharge.
After learning that Walker had declared bankruptcy, the Higleys pe-
titioned the state district court for an order directing payment of their
judgment out of Utah's Real Estate Recovery Fund (Fund), a monetary
fund established by the State of Utah to satisfy judgments against real
estate licensees in actions based on fraud, misrepresentation or deceit
committed in real estate transactions. The state district court granted
the Higleys' petition and the State of Utah complied with the court's
order by paying the Higleys. Subsequently, Walker filed a motion in
Utah state court to vacate the judgment against him, alleging that the
judgment was void because it was entered after the section 362(a) auto-
matic stay had gone into effect. On November 16, 1987, Walker filed an
adversary proceeding against the Higleys and their attorney, claiming
violation of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions and seek-
ing damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).14 6
Meanwhile, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the state court judg-
ment was void, having been entered after the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, and the judgment was vacated. 147 Thereupon, the Utah At-
torney General requested that the state court order the Higleys to repay
143. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B), which reads in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727 ... does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt -
(1) for a tax...
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed ....
144. Id. at 343.
145. 927 F.2d 1138 (10th Cir. 1991).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) states: An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorney's fees,
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
147. 927 F.2d at 1141.
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the Fund the sum previously paid to them in satisfaction of the now-void
judgment. The Higleys responded to the recovery efforts of the Utah
Attorney General by filing various motions in the bankruptcy court in-
tended to confirm their right to the monies received from the Fund.
The bankruptcy court denied each of these motions.148 The Higleys ap-
pealed the bankruptcy court denials of their motions for relief from the
post-discharge injunction or for an extension of time in which to deter-
mine the dischargeability of their claim against Walker. The district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court' 4 9 and the Higleys appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Tenth Circuit decision is of interest in this survey because of
the court's discussion of the effect and purposes of the post-discharge
injunction provided by 11 U.S.C. § 524 (a) (2). 150 The injunction pre-
vents the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of a process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived. The intent of this post-discharge injunction is to protect debt-
ors like Walker in their financial fresh start following discharge.
The court (Judge Logan) indicated that section 524 further pro-
vides that discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity, for such debt. 15 1
This latter provision permits a creditor to bring or continue an action
directly against the debtor for the purpose of establishing the debtor's
liability when, as here, establishment of that liability is a prerequisite to
recovery from another entity. Since, in this case, the Higleys sought to
continue their state court action against Walker for the sole purpose of
confirming their right to the Fund monies previously paid to them, the
Court of Appeals found no basis for the lower courts' determination that
the Higleys' efforts to renew this action threatened Walker's financial
fresh start. 152
The court found no reason to reverse the denial of the Higleys' mo-
tion for an extension of time in which to challenge the dischargeability
of their claim against Walker. A complaint against discharge of a credi-
tor's claim must be filed within 60 days after the first meeting of credi-
tors,' 5 3 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c).15 4 In this case
148. ld
149. Id
150. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2):
(a) A discharge in a case under this title-
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continua-
tion of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or
offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not dis-
charge of such a debt is waived;
151. 927 F.2d at 1142. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) states: Except as provided in subsection
(a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any
other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.
152. 927 F.2d at 1143.
153. Id at 1144.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) states:
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the Higleys had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to
proceed.
IX. CONCLUSION
A number of comments follow from a study of the Tenth Circuit's
busy year with bankruptcy cases. The structure of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code is complex. Congress was reacting to many policy issues in the
process of reforming bankruptcy law and many policy issues were in-
completely resolved, arguably, even in the 1984 Amendments. This ob-
server predicts a continued flow of cases to the Tenth Circuit asking for
clarification of these issues. There does not appear to be any discernible
"trend" in the Tenth Circuit cases.
The Tenth Circuit tends not to be a pro-debtor bankruptcy court,
but there are really no simple answers to many of these issues. There
will continue to be splits in the circuits. One might also predict continu-
ing Supreme Court activity to resolve such splits. It is unlikely that Con-
gress will act soon to simplify the judicial task of applying this mammoth
statute. A final comment - history repeats itself in the sense that the
prior Bankruptcy Act required constant judicial interpretation and one
can expect the same for the current 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
Neil 0. Littlefield,
Steve Hall*
(c) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor shall
be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of sub-
section (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be ex-
cepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of
subsection (a) of this section.
Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), 11 U.S.C. § states:
(c) Time for Filing Complaint Under § 523(c) in Chapter 7 Liquidation,
Chapter 11 Reorganization, and Chapter 12 Family Farmer's Debt Adjustment
Cases; Notice of Time Fixed.
A complaint to determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to
§ 523(c) of the Code shall be filed not later than 60 days following the first date
set for the meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341(a). The court shall give all
creditors not less than 30 days notice of the time so fixed in the manner provided
in Rule 2002. On motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice, the
court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion
shall be made before the time has expired.
* Neil 0. Littlefield, B.S., LL.B., LL.M., SJ.D., is Professor of Law at University of
Denver College of Law. Steve Hall is a graduating law student at the College of Law.
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